The Effect of Superfund Liability on Property Owners by Bell, Michael A.
Volume 92 Issue 1 Article 8 
September 1989 
The Effect of Superfund Liability on Property Owners 
Michael A. Bell 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael A. Bell, The Effect of Superfund Liability on Property Owners, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. (1989). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/8 
This Student Work is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE EFFECT OF SUPERFUND LIABILITY ON
PROPERTY "OWNERS"
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 125
II. FEDERAL HAzARDous WASTE LEGISLATION ................... 127
III. THE SCOPE OF SUPERFUND LIABILITY .......................... 130
A. Overview ........................................................ 130
B. Standard of Liability ........................................ 133
1. Strict Liability ........................................... 133
2. Joint and Several Liability ........................... 134
C. Who Is Liable ................................................. 136
1. Owners and Operators ................................ 136
2. Lenders .................................................... 139
3. Corporate Officers and Majority Shareholders 141
4. Lessors and Lessees .................................... 143
5. Trustees .................................................... 144
IV. PROCEDURES TO LIMIT ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ......... 144
A. Statutory Defenses ............................................ 144
B. Environmental Investigation ............................... 148
C. Contractual Provisions ...................................... 149
D. Insurance ........................................................ 150
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 150
I. INTRODUCTION
The disposal of hazardous wastes' has recently created a height-
ened public concern for environmental protection. The problem of
cleaning up and assigning liability for the disposal of hazardous
substances first received widespread public attention in the mid-
1970's.2 Throughout the 1980's federal, state, and local jurisdictions
1. This Note interchangeably uses the terms "hazardous waste," "hazardous substance,"
"contamination," and "toxic waste." The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), uses only the term "hazardous substance."
2. See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 CoLTJm. J. EvT. L. 1 (1982) (a discussion
of the legislation proposed prior to the passage of CERCLA); S. CooKE, LAW OF HAZARDOUS WAsTE:
MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LiAY, AND LITIGATION § 12.0111] (1987).
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have addressed this public concern through the promulgation of broad
legislative and regulatory requirements designed to control the re-
lease of environmental pollutants.3 This extensive effort to control
the discharge of pollutants resulted in a regulatory scheme that has
become inextricably interwoven with traditional property law.4 Spe-
cifically, the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, commonly known
as the Superfund, imposed a substantial burden on property owners
by holding them strictly liable for any environmental wastes dis-
covered on their property. Consequently, this legislation has affected
long standing methods of doing business including the ownership
and transfer of real property interests.5
Traditionally, real estate practitioners have not considered en-
vironmental contingencies. However, because prospective purchasers
today risk exposure to millions of dollars in liabilities for hazardous
wastes hidden on a parcel of property, they are increasingly turning
to environmental lawyers .6 Consequently, real estate practitioners are
finding it essential to respond to this concern by careful examination
of the most recent environmental legislation and litigation, identi-
fication of the environmental concerns directly affecting a specific
property transaction, and assessment of potential liability on the
parties.7
This Note will explore how the evolution of environmental li-
ability has affected the traditional practice of real estate law. Part
I examines the legislative history and framework of the federal sta-
tutes that govern the disposal and clean up of hazardous wastes and
discusses generally their relevance in the recognition of environ-
mental issues in real estate transactions. Part II discusses the scope
of Superfund liability as the federal courts have applied it to past
3. White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our Hazardous Wastes, 25
Hous. L. REv. 899 (1988).
4. See Marzulla, Keynote Address, in BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON PRIVATE
PROPERTY OwNERSHIP AND BusNmSS TRANSACTIONS: REASONABLE OR UNREASONABLE?, 2 (1988).
5. See Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 CoLUM. L. REV.
942 (1988).
6. Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real
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and present "owners and operators" of land on which there has
been a release hazardous wastes. Finally, Part III reviews procedures
currently utilized to limit environmental liability in real estate trans-
actions.
II. FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE LEGISLATION
Environmental protection from the problems associated with haz-
ardous waste disposal emerged as a national priority in the mid-
1970's.8 Initially, in 1976, Congress addressed this concern with the
passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)9
which established the framework for solving the discarded materials
disposal problem and for minimizing the dangers of hazardous waste
disposal.' 0 RCRA proved to be self limiting, however, because it
focused on current and future activities," while previously aban-
doned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites were the sites pos-
ing the greatest threat to the environment. 2 Therefore, on December
11, 1980, Congress signed into law the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA)13 which created a unique legal and financial apparatus to
address the release of hazardous substances into the environment
and the cleanup of inactive waste disposal sites. 14 Later, in 1986,
Congress substantially amended, expanded, and reauthorized CER-
CLA. The amended CERCLA, entitled the Superfund Amendment
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 15 is a significantly larger,
8. See generally F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY (1984); W. FRANK & T. ATKESON, SuERruND: LITIGATION AND CL NUr 1 (1985).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-34 (1982), amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224, (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991
(Supp. III 1985)).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD M N. NEws 6238, 6248-49.
11. Id.
12. E.g., Note, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980: Is Joint and Several Liability the Answer to Superfund? 18 Naw ENG. L. REv. 109, 112
n. 22 (1982).
13. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982); CERCLA originally created a $1.6 billion 'super-
fund' to finance the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
14. Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD~mi. NEws 6119,
6119-20.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (Supp. IV 1986).
1989]
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more detailed, more stringent, and more ambitious attempt to clean
up the nation's hazardous waste sites. 16
Through the passage of CERCLA, Congress sought to provide
a body of comprehensive legislation as a means to cleanup the many
sites nationwide which were contaminated with hazardous subst-
ances. CERCLA imposes liability for cleanup costs on an wide range
of potentially responsible parties. 17 The statute imposes liability on
those who are both directly and indirectly responsible for causing
the contamination of a site by disposing of, or arranging for the
disposal of, hazardous wastes. In a case where the responsible parties
can neither be found nor identified, CERCLA imposes strict liability
on the current "owner or operator" of the site. This statute max-
imizes the likelihood that there will be at least one financially re-
sponsible party capable of funding the cleanup effort. CERCLA
provides two methods to accomplish this cleanup effort: either the
responsible parties may themselves undertake the task of cleanup,
allocating costs responsibility among themselves, or the government
can undertake the cleanup and seek reimbursement from the re-
sponsible parties.18 In either instance, the CERCLA liability pro-
visions may require prior owners, current owners and other parties
with a legal interest in a parcel of land to participate in the cleanup
of any hazardous wastes discovered on the property even though
the wastes were deposited prior to obtaining an interest in the site.
Even though Congress set aside more than eight billion dollars19
to finance cleanup efforts, it also clearly intended to rely on re-
sponsible parties as a substantial source of cleanup funding. 20 There-
fore, to protect the federal government's huge investment in the
16. S. CooKc, supra note 2, at § 12.0211].
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Potentially responsible parties include: (1) the present owner or op-
erator of a site; (2) any person who at the time of contamination owned or operated any facility at
which the contamination occurred; (3) any generator who arranged to have waste taken to a hazardous
site for treatment or disposal; and (4) any person who transported waste for treatment or disposal.
Id.
18. 42 U.S.C §§ 9604, 9607, 9622.
19. The 1986 amendment increased the Fund to more than 8 billion dollars. See 42 U.S.C. §
9611 (Supp. IV 1986).
20. Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA; Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STN.
ENv-L. L.J. 271, 282 (1986-1987).
[Vol. 92
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Superfund, the courts have, at the urging of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA),2' proceeded to develop an extremely expan-
sive interpretation of liability under CERCLA. 22 Under this broad
interpretation, the courts almost uniformly impose joint and several
liability without regard to the fault of individuals having an interest
in the contaminated property. As a result of the broad interpretation
and strict enforcement of the Superfund liability provisions, the real
estate industry has noticed a pronounced increase in the risks as-
sociated with the acquisition or disposal of real property.
To become more adept at handling this increased risk, real estate
practitioners must begin to consider the substances and costs covered
under CERCLA as well as the standard of liability and to whom
that standard applies. By recognizing both the environmental law
elements implicit in a real estate transaction and understanding the
scope of liability associated with a given property, the real estate
practitioner can thoroughly evaluate the risks involved in a trans-
action and acquire the requisite awareness necessary to identify, ad-
dress, and resolve the environmental issues associated with the
transfer of interests in real estate.
While CERCLA and SARA are the major federal statutes ad-
dressing hazardous substance cleanup and liability in the context of
real property transactions, a number of other environmental statutes
include regulatory requirements and enforcement provisions that im-
pose liability on responsible parties for the discharge of hazardous
substances into the environment. Some of these statutes impose
cleanup requirements as well. They include the RCRA,2 3 the Clean
21. The objective of the EPA is to "cleanup [hazardous waste] sites. Thus, [the EPA] take[s]
broad, sometimes ambiguous provisions of the law and consistently seek[s] to expand them to further
that end. In certain areas, the result is that potentially responsible parties will encounter considerable
difficulty, in a way that they might not expect." Lucero, EPA's Role in and Perspectives on Property
Transfer and Financing Liabilities, in BURDENS OF ENVmO NTAL REGULATION ON PlrVATE PROPERTY
OwNERsam AND BusINss TRaNSACTIONS: REASONABLE OR UNRASONABLE? 18 (1988). (Address by Gene
A. Lucero, Director, Office of Waste Program Enforcement Environmental Protection Agency).
22. Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARv. ENvTI.. L. REv.
385, 393-94 (1988). See also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986) (construing the statute liberally to achieve the legislative beneficial purpose).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6911 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). RCRA is of importance primarily to
businesses that generate, store, treat, transport, or dispose of hazardous wastes. However, RCRA can
19891
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Water Act, 24 the Safe Drinking Water Act, 25 the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 26 and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act .2
III. THE SCOPE OF SUPERFUND LIABILITY
A. Overview
Generally, CERCLA imposes liability and provides for cleanup
and emergency response actions in the event of a release of haz-
ardous substances and for the cleanup of inactive and abandoned
waste disposal sites. The statute's provisions for emergency response
authorizes the government 2 to respond or compel response,29 with-
out the need of court approval, in ordei to protect against imminent
and substantial dangers to the health and welfare of the public and
the environment.
Specifically, Superfund legislation prohibits the release 0 of any
be an unexpected source of liability in the transfer of contaminated property for a purchaser who
played no role in the generation, storage or handling of the hazardous wastes. See H.R. REP. 1491,
supra note 10, at 28. Under RCRA's "imminent hazard" provision, a purchaser may be subject to
liability for past actions that create current environmental hazards. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982). Like
CERCLA, RCRA therefore can impose liability on a current owner who took no part in the past
release of hazardous wastes which currently "present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment." Id. A full discussion of RCRA liability is beyond the scope of this Note.
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j(ll) (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1982).
27. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
28. The Act provides that the President is authorized to delegate and assign any duties or powers
imposed upon or assigned to him to carry out the provisions of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 9615.
The President delegated much of the authority under the Act to various federal agencies. Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981). The EPA was given broad discretion in im-
plementing CERCLA. Id.
29. The Government is authorized to remove, arrange for removal, take remedial action or
take any measure necessary in response to the release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23),(24),
9604(b).
30. For the purposes of CERCLA: The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes ... any
release which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which
such persons may assert against the employer of such persons ... emissions from the engine exhaust
of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine ... release of
source, byproduct or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident ... and ... the normal ap-
plication of fertilizer. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
6
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hazardous substance3 into the environment 2 from a facility 3 or
vessel3 4 which necessitates the expenditure of response costs35 to clean
up the site. When a substance defined by CERCLA as hazardous
has been released or is threatened to be released, the federal gov-
ernment may unilaterally undertake remedial or removal action with-
out determining that the release presents a danger to the public health
or environment. Additionally, the government may recover the costs
31. A substance is determined to be hazardous based on characteristics such as toxicity, cor-
rosivity and reactivity. See Council On Environmental Quality, Thirteenth Annual Report, 95-97 (1982),
reprinted in F. GRAD, ENVIRONhMNTAL LAW § 4.04, at 639-40 (3rd ed. 1985).
The term "hazardous substance" is broadly defined with reference to all of the major existing
federal environmental statutes, and includes any substance designated or regulated under any of the
following statutory provisions: (1) any hazardous substance designated under 31 1(b)(2)(A) of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) listed at 40 C.F.R. § 116; (2) any toxic pollutant listed under
§ 307A of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 listed at 40 C.F.R. § 401.15; (3) any hazardous
waste under § 3001 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 listed at 40 C.F.R. § 261; (4) any hazardous air
pollution under § 112(b)(l)(A) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) listed at 40 C.F.R.
§ 61; or (5) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture under § 7 of the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
All Superfund hazardous substances are listed alphabetically in Table 302.4 following 40 C.F.R.
§ 302.4 published at 50 Fed. Reg. 13,475 (1985).
Because CERCLA defines the term "hazardous substance" by referencing substances defined as
hazardous in a vast number of previously enacted environmental statutes, the courts have consistently
interpreted this provision quite broadly to achieve the beneficial legislative purpose. Dedham Water,
805 F.2d at 1081. See also Eagle-Picher Industries v. United States E.P.A., 759 F.2d 922, 930-31
(D.C. Cir. 1985) extending an extremely narrow interpretation of the statutory exemptions to hold
that mining wastes are included in the coverage of "hazardous substances," even though legislative
history suggests that mining wastes were intended to be excluded from the meaning of hazardous
waste; United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Ariz. 1984) specifically including
chrysotile asbestos within the definition of "hazardous substance" despite the contention that jt was
not hazardous to human health. (The court found that if it was not hazardous, it was the responsibility
of Congress to provide an exemption).
32. For the purposes of CERCLA: The term "environment" means ... the navigable waters,
the waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural resources are under
the exclusive management authority of the United States ... and ... any other surface water, ground
water, drinking water supply, land surface, or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United
States . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8).
33. For the purposes of CERCLA: The term "facility" means ... any building, structure,
installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline, (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or ... any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but it does not include any consumer product
in consumer use or vessel. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
34. For the purposes of CERCLA, The term "vessel" means every description of watercraft
or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(28).
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to clean up a CERCLA site from any responsible party in an action
brought in federal court. 6 Recoverable costs include the expenditures
associated with response, removal, and remedial action incurred by
the federal government as well as the costs incurred as a result of
the destruction to natural resources. The courts have consistently
applied a broad interpretation to response cost liability. As a result,
this allows for recovery of all litigation costs, including attorneys
fees, and administrative and investigative costs associated with the
cleanup .38
Once liability is imposed upon a person, "[a]ll costs and damages
for which a person is liable ... shall constitute a lien in the favor
of the United States upon all real property . . .which belong[s] to
such person." ' 39 This lien remains attached to the property until sat-
isfied. 4° Subsequently, this attachment may impede the ability to
transfer or to finance a property thereby creating additional concern
for all parties in the real estate industry. However, this concern is
suppressed to an extent because the federal lien provision is subject
to previously perfected security interests of other creditors.4'
36. A guiding principle underlying CERCLA is that the cost of hazardous waste cleanup should
rest on those ultimately responsible for the waste. In this way Congress intended to shift the burden
to the industries and consumers who benefit most directly from products and services associated with
the waste. The Committee on Environment and Public Works noted:
[Tihe goal of assuring that those who caused the chemical harm bear the cost of the harm
is addressed by the imposition of liability. Strict liability, the foundation of S. 1480, assures
that those who benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the health and
environmental cost of doing business ....
S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 62 (1980).
For a general discussion of cost allocation under CERCLA, see Note, Allocating the Costs of
Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARv. L. RE. 584 (1981).
37. Recoverable costs and damages under the liability provisions of CERCLA include: all costs
of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State; any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; damages
for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and the costs of any health assessment
or health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977, 997 (D.N.H. 1988), United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850-52 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(hereinafter "NEPACCO"), rev'd on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), United States v.
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984, 1008-09 (D.S.C. 1984).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(1).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(2).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(3).
[Vol. 92
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The liens created by state superfund statutes pose an even greater
concern for the real estate practitioner. 42 Several states have enacted
"superlien" provisions that impose a first priority lien upon the real
property of a responsible party.43 Unlike CERCLA, the state statutes
go much further in ensuring that the state recoups its cleanup costs
through the imposition of retroactive, first-priority liens on secured
property. 44 Typically, the superlien provisions apply only to non-
residential property within the state.45 As a result, purchasers, sellers,
lenders, lessors and title insurers of property should be aware of
any applicable state laws that may be a source of additional liability
in the transfer of any property which may have been used as a
disposal site for hazardous wastes.46
B. Standard of Liability
1. Strict Liability
The liability provision of CERCLA 47 has been the subject of
considerable controversy, due in great part to the lack of guidance
that the statute provides as to its intended liability scheme. 48 Section
107(a) of CERCLA, the heart of the liability provision, establishes
liability under the statute, but fails to provide an adequate standard
with which this liability shall be applied. Instead, the statute requires
the standard to be construed under the interpretation given to a
42. Approximately 80% of the states have passed superfund statutes similar to CERCLA. See
Note, The Impact of State "Superlien " Statutes on Real Estate Transactions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES
L. 297 (1986). [... I See also S. TAsHER, J. DEAN, S. OSTER, & B. KAuFmAN, ENVIRONMENTAl. LAws
AND REAL ESTATE HANDBOOK IV-21 (2d ed. 1987).
43. See Note, supra note 42, at 298. See also Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 6, at 10,012.
44. See, e.g., MAss. Am. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-
23.11 (Vest 1982 & 1989 Supp.). See also Comment, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CER-
CLA: Conflict or Complement?, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,348 (1983).
45. ANrELO and BERoEsON, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and
Its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REv. 101, 107-08 (1985).
46. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (reviewing real estate concerns posed by state
superlien provisions).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
48. "CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently for
unartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage. Problems of in-
terpretation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately defined terms . . . ." Artesian Water Co.
v. New Castle Cty., 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987)).
19891
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similar liability provision in the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970 (commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA)). 49 However,
the liability standard provided under the CWA is equally ambiguous,
as certain language parallels CERCLA.5 0
Because CERCLA lacks a clear standard of liability, the courts
have utilized CERCLA's legislative history 5 ' cases decided under the
CWA liability standard, and an adaptation of common law which
is reflected in the "abnormally dangerous" doctrine of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts52 to impose a standard of strict liability on
potentially responsible parties involved with CERCLA litigation. 3
Under this standard, the courts force financially solvent parties to
bear the cost of cleanup even if they had nothing to do with the
disposal or release of hazardous wastes. However, the 1986 Super-
fund Amendments, to an extent, mitigated the harsh operation of
strict liability. The Amendment provided an exemption to any party
who acquired a site after the disposal of hazardous wastes and who
demonstrated that prior to purchase, it diligently inspected the land
and found no evidence that waste was contained thereon.14
2. Joint and Several Liability
Although CERCLA does not specifically provide for joint and
several liability, the courts generally follow an analysis similar to
49. See statutes cited supra note 24. CERCLA provides that liability "shall be construed to be
the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of title 33." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
50. The liability standard under CWA provides that the responsible party "shall... be liable"
for costs. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1).
51. The legislative history of the liability provision indicates that the CERCLA standard of
liability is that of strict liability. See, e.g., "The liability provisions of this [CERCLA] bill do not
refer to the terms strict . . . liability .... I have reviewed carefully the statutory ... and precedents
under [CWA]. I have concluded that despite the absence of [the] specific [term], the strict liability
standard ... is preserved." 126 CONG. REc. Hi1,787 (daily ed. December 3, 1980) (statement of
Rep. Florio) "Unless otherwise provided in the act [CERCLA], the standard of liability is intended
to be the same as that provided in [CWA]. I understand that to be a standard of strict liability."
120 CoNG. Rac. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Senator Randolph).
52. REsTATEMENT (SEcoNm) OF TORTS, §§ 519, 520 (1977).
53. See Frost, Strict Liability as an Incentive For Cleanup of Contaminated Property, 25 Hous.
L. Ray. 951, 951-52 (1988). See also, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 & n.ll
(4th Cir. 1988) (citing cases), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-
Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.
Ohio 1983).
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that utilized in the development of strict liability. Due to the absence
of statutory guidelines, the courts rely on the prevailing common
law principle of a "single and indivisible harm ' 55 to impose a stan-
dard of joint and several liability on all parties to a CERCLA action
unless a clear basis for division of responsibility exists.5 6 Thus, for
example, the courts may require a current property owner of a haz-
ardous waste site to shoulder a disproportionate share of the total
cleanup effort, even if all of the contamination occurred prior to
obtaining an interest in the property.5 7 However, the statutory pro-
vision that allows an innocent party who initially is held liable for
cleanup costs to seek contribution from other responsible parties
tends to temper the apparent severity of joint and several liability.5 8
In deciding contribution issues, the courts generally analyze the spe-
cific factual circumstances of a case to determine the appropriate
equitable factors such as relative fault to apportion the costs of
cleanup to all responsible parties.
Even though CERCLA does not definitively address the scope
of liability, the district courts and more recently the circuit courts,
have almost unanimously adopted a very expansive interpretation of
CERCLA liability. However, the courts have somewhat narrowed
the scope of recovery by expressly refraining from imposing liability
for loss to property rights, the cost of personal injury, or third party
economic damages that are attributable to a contaminated site.60
55. RESTATEENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977).
56, See, e.g., Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90 (D. Colo. 1985); Wehner
v. Syntex Agribusiness, 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (ED. Mo. 1985); United States v. Conservation Chemical
Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (W.D, Mo. 1984); United States v. AF Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810.
For a discussion of the development of joint and several liability in hazardous waste litigation,
see Note, supra note 45, at 109.
57. E.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043-44.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
59. See, e.g., Versatile Metals, v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F. Supp 391, 404 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (citing cases);
Velsiclo Chemical Corp. v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1118, 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,103 (E.D. Tenn 1984). See generally Prager, Apportioning Liability for
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. Emrr. L. J. 198 (1986-1987).
60. See, e.g., Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1988); New
Castle Cty., 659 F. Supp. at 1285-88.
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C. Who Is Liable
Section 107 (a) of CERCLA provides that response costs may
be recovered from, among others, the current owner or operator of
a contaminated site, as well as any person who previously owned
or operated a site during the time in which hazardous wastes were
deposited thereon.6 ' The current decisions interpreting the "owner
or operator" language rely on the comprehensive nature of CER-
CLA's provisions to consistently expand liability. Present and past
owners of property have been distinguished by holding the latter
liable only if they owned or operated the facility at the time wastes
were deposited.62 Current owners and operators are apparently held
strictly liable for all prior disposals regardless of whether they had
any relationship to the responsible parties or any knowledge of the
presence of toxic substances on the property when they acquired it.63
The majority of the circuit courts and a considerable number of
the district courts have had the opportunity to address and define
the breadth of liability imposed upon the "owners and operators"
of property. As a result, buyers, sellers, lessors, lessees, trustees,
lenders, and a variety of other sophisticated parties dealing with real
estate have become entangled in the expansive web of CERCLA
liability as "owners or operators" of hazardous waste sites.
1. Owners and Operators
One of the earliest and most often cited circuit court decisions
addressing the scope of CERCLA's liability provisions imposed on
current property owners is State of New York v. Shore Realty Cor-
poration.6 Shore Realty Corp. purchased a 3.2 acre tract of wa-
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)(2).
CERCLA also extends liability to any generator who arranged to have waste taken to a site for
treatment and any person who transported any waste to a selected site. U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(3), (4).
62. See Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chemical Co., 21 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108,
14 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20376 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that prior owners having no
involvement with any hazardous waste disposal may not be held liable), aff'd, 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1988).
63. See 131 CONG. REc. H11158-59 (daily ed. December 5, 1985) (statement of Reps. Breaux,
Frank and Moakley).
64. 759 F.2d at 1032.
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terfront property to be utilized for condominium development. Before
purchasing the property, Shore's environmental consultant had pre-
pared a detailed report and concluded that the property contained
hazardous wastes which would have to be removed prior to breaking
ground for construction. Subsequent to Shore's acquisition of the
site and prior to the start of development activities, the State of
New York commenced cleanup efforts and brought suit against Shore
Realty under CERCLA § 107(a)(1) for the response costs it incurred.
Shore argued that it was not covered by CERCLA § 107(a)(1)
because it neither owned the site at the time of disposal nor caused
the release of hazardous materials. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found Shore liable as a current owner without regard
to culpability.65 This interpretation closed a potential loophole un-
intentionally left in the statute by Congress. 66 In the absence of this
interpretation, property owners or operators could churn their prop-
erty after the release of contaminants in an effort to eliminate ex-
posure to liability.
Since the Shore Realty decision, the courts have endeavored to
develop a workable meaning of "owner or operator" to supplement
the inadequate circular reasoning provided by the statutory defi-
nition.67 At least one circuit court has established that the circular
nature of the statutory language implies that the defined terms have
their ordinary meanings rather than unusual or technical interpre-
tations. 68 In an attempt to employ the ordinary meaning of the stat-
65. Id. at 1044.
66. The court rejected Shore Realty's arguments:
if the current owner of a site could [clearly] avoid liability merely by having purchased the
site after chemical dumping had ceased, waste cites certainly would be sold, following the
cessation of dumping, to new owners who could avoid the liability otherwise required by
CERCLA. Congress had well in mind that persons who dump or store hazardous wastes
sometimes cannot be located or may be deceased or judgment proof. [This Court] will not
interpret section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the
absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise.
Id. at 1045 (citations omitted). See also Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1988) ("the current owner of a facility as well as the entity that owned the
facility at the time of hazardous substance was deposited are liable under CERCLA ... for rectifying
the condition . . ").
67. CERCLA provides that "[t]he term 'owner or Operator' means ... in the case of an
onshore facility . . ., any person owning or operating such facility .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
68. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988).
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utory language and to provide additional guidance to the application
of CERCLA liability, the courts have produced divergent opinions
defining the ordinary meaning of property "owner".
For example, a district court in FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump
Co. 69 found that the mere ownership of property at the time haz-
ardous wastes are deposited thereon is not sufficient to hold the
owner financially responsible for any portion of the cleanup effort. 70
The court concluded that both ownership and accountability for the
disposal of hazardous wastes are required to impose financial lia-
bility on a party.71 On the other hand, a district court in United
States v. Carolawn72 ascertained that despite a statutory provision
which provides an exemption from liability for persons who do not
participate in the management of a facility and who merely hold
the indicia of ownership to protect a security interest,73 financial
responsibility may be imposed upon a company that held legal title
and control over a contaminated site for just one hour.74
In addition to defining "owner," the courts have likewise strug-
gled to develop a uniform definition of an "operator" of a CER-
CLA site. The Fourth Circuit recently held that a state governmental
agency was not an "operator" of a hazardous waste site. The agency
was not held financially responsible under the liability provisions of
CERCLA even though the agency supervised, monitored and loosely
regulated the activities at an abandoned waste site. 75 The court held
that the agency was not an operator due to the lack of any "hands-
on" activities that could be construed as direct site management. 76
69. 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn., 1987), appeal dismissed, 871 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1988).
70. Id. at 1290-91.
71. Id.
72. 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984), 14 Envtl. L. Rep, (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20698
(1984).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii).
74. Carolawn, 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2124 (D.S.C. 1984), 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) at 20698 (1984),
75. United States v. Dart Industries, 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988).
76, Id. CERCLA provides an exemption from liability for a State governmental unit that ac-
quires control of a site due to abandonment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). However, the exclusion "does
not apply to any State or local government which caused or contributed to the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from the facility .... " Id. See also NEPACCO., 810 F.2d at 743
(8th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that "the authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous
substances" is "critical" to the statutory scheme).
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The Seventh Circuit turned to common law analogies to further
distinguish the meaning of "Operator" in Edward Hines Lumber
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.77 This court ruled that the defendant-
appellee, who designed and built the facility responsible for the re-
lease of contaminants, furnished the toxic materials, trained the em-
ployees, and reserved a right to inspect the ongoing operation, was
an independent contractor.7 8 At common law, the employer of an
independent contractor is not responsible for the contractor's torts.
Accordingly, the court held that even though the contractor was
involved in the management and decision process that created the
hazardous situation, an independent contractor is not an "operator"
under common law doctrine. Therefore, the independent contractor
avoided responsibility under the CERCLA liability provisions. 79
Case law interpreting "owner and operator" is still developing,
but the trend has been to apply the statutory definition literally.
However, in a situation that is not easily defined within the par-
ameters of the ordinary meaning of "owner or operator," the extent
to which control or legal ownership alone confers irrefutable re-
sponsibility is somewhat unclear. Therefore, in this unsettled climate,
the conservative approach suggests that any party who maintains
any interest in or control over property through either managerial
influence or legal mechanisms may be considered an "owner or op-
erator" of such property and subject to CERCLA liability for cleanup
costs. Whether or not the party was directly or indirectly involved
with the disposal or release of hazardous wastes is immaterial.
2. Lenders
Legislative history suggests that Congress intended to provide an
exemption from liability for creditors who hold title to property
primarily to secure a loan so long as they do not participate in the
management of the site or assume the full range of operational re-
sponsibility.80 Additionally, the statutory definition of "owner and
77. Vulcan Materials, 861 F.2d at 157.
78. Id. at 158.
79. Id. at 157.
80. H. R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmN. NEWS 6160, 6181.
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operator" expressly excludes a party who merely holds the indicia
of ownership of a property to protect a secured interest.8 However,
due to recent judicial interpretations of this provision, financial lend-
ing institutions may have to face the risk of exposure to CERCLA
liability.
United States v. Mirabile2 addressed the issue of the security
interest exception as it pertained to "owner or operator" liability.
In Mirabile several financial institutions had interests secured by real
property and assets of a company that was found to be responsible
for the release of hazardous wastes on the mortgaged property.83
Interpreting the security interest exception, the court imposed no
liability on the lender that purchased the site at a foreclosure sale
and subsequently assigned its interest to a third party within several
months.8 4 The court concluded that the purchase upon foreclosure
was undertaken solely in an effort to protect a secured interest in
the property. 85 However, the court denied a second lender's motion
for summary judgment and held that it may be subject to liability
as a result of its postbankruptcy activities which included involve-
ment in the day-to-day operations of the failed company.86
In a more recent decision, United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co.,87 a district court granted summary judgment to hold a
bank liable after it foreclosed and acquired title to waste-laden prop-
erty that served as security for a mortgage.88 The bank purchased
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). The term " 'owner or operator' . . . does not include a person,
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." Id.
82. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
83. Id. at 20994.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 20996.
86. Id. at 20997.
87. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). This case has been the subject of considerable discussion.
See generally James, Financial Institutions and Hazardous Waste Litigation: Limiting the Exposure
to Superfund Liability, 28 NAT. RIsouRcEs J. 329, 339-41 (1988); Burcat, Environmental Liability
of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BArNcito L.J. 509
(1986); Note, When Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders In Hazardous Waste Cleanup,
38 HAsTmG L.J. 1261, 1280-85 (1987); Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MiAmi
L. REv. 879, 891-94 (1987).
88. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 582.
[Vol. 92
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol92/iss1/8
SUPERFUND LIABILITY
the site upon foreclosure for approximately $380,000 and held title
for four years during which the EPA incurred approximately $550,000
in cleanup costs.89 The court concluded that the security interest
exception did not apply to "former mortgagees currently holding
title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when,
as here, the former mortgagee has held title for nearly four years
and a full year before the EPA cleanup." 90 Thus, the lender became
the "owner" of the property by virtue of the length of time the
title was held. Accordingly, the court held the bank liable for the
full cost of the cleanup effort.9' While financial institutions can take
comfort in the liability exclusion for parties merely holding the in-
dicia of ownership for the protection of a security interest, the courts
have placed lenders on notice that strict liability will be imposed if
the lender becomes more involved with the daily operations and
management of the property.
3. Corporate Officers and Majority Shareholders
Generally, corporate officers, majority shareholders, and parent
corporations are not liable for the torts of a corporation in which
they have an interest. However, a number of courts have ruled that
the corporate or individual representatives that exercise control over
an entity may be responsible for the acts of such entity. 92 The courts
have again utilized an expansive interpretation of the CERCLA li-
ability provisions to place the financial responsibility of cleanup ef-
forts on an entity that may be only remotely involved with the
contamination of a hazardous waste site.
The majority of courts that have imposed financial responsibility
on corporate officers, majority stockholders, and parent corpora-
tions have developed a theory of liability directly from the statutory
89. Id. at 575-76.
90. Id. at 579.
91. Id. at 582.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d
at 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986). See also Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988); Idaho
v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
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language provided in CERCLA.93 These decisions do not address
the "corporate veil" doctrine. Instead, the courts completely ignore
the implications of the corporate form and ground their rulings on
the judicial interpretation of statutory terms such as "owner or op-
erator, '94 "person, ' 95 and "control. ' 96 Several courts have relied
on a strict literal reading of the liability provisions of CERCLA to
impose financial responsibility for cleanup costs on any person who
owns an interest in a facility and actively participates in its man-
agement.97 This line of cases purports to promote Congressional in-
tent by utilizing a literal interpretation of the statute. 98 These decisions
have highlighted the fact that the statutory definition of "owner or
operator" excludes from liability a person who does not participate
in the management of a facility responsible for the release of haz-
ardous wastes. 99 Therefore, because a non-manager is specifically
excluded from liability, a literal interpretation of the statute and its
construction implies the imposition of liability on persons who ac-
tively participate in the management of a facility.
A second line of cases that impose liability on officers and stock-
holders has rested on the degree of control that these parties exercise
over the management and disposal of hazardous wastes. 100 These
93. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement, 851 F.2d at 92 (imposing successor liability on parent
corporations which have either merged with or consolidated with a corporation that is a responsible
party); NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 744 (holding corporate officers liable as "persons" who arranged
the disposal of hazardous wastes and as an "owner or operator" of the facility responsible for the
contamination); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052 (holding officer and majority shareholder liable as
"'owner or operator"); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (plant su-
pervisor and chief executive officer had ultimate authority for corporate decision and therefore were
held individually liable as "owners or operators"); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672
(D. Idaho 1986) (holding the parent corporation liable as "owner or operator" with respect to a
subsidiary's facilities); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 190 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (holding that "corporate officials who actively participated in the management of a disposal
facility can be held personally liable" as "owners or operators"). See also United States v. Mottolo,
605 F. Supp. 898, 914 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894-95 (E.D.N.C.
1985); NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49; Carolawn, Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2128.
94. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
97. E.g., Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 188-89; NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-
49.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 848. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
100. See, e.g., Shore Realty, 579 F.2d at 1052; Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672.
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decisions do not automatically impose liability on parent corpora-
tions or officers and stockholders by the mere virtue of their man-
agement positions. These decisions consider the extent to which a
party influences and controls the corporate operations. More spe-
cifically, these decisions hinge on the amount of direct control that
the officer, stockholder, or parent has over the final decisions sur-
rounding the disposal of hazardous waste. These decisions have
largely ignored the traditional common law theory of limited liability
for corporate officers and stockholders. While neither the legislative
history nor the express language of the statute provides for the im-
position of liability on corporate officers, majority shareholders, or
parent corporations, the courts have undertaken an extensive effort
to expand the liability provisions of CERCLA to include these groups.
By imposing financial liability on those parties who are directly re-
sponsible for the decisions to dispose of waste products, the courts
are able to promote the congressional objectives which require haz-
ardous waste cleanup costs to be borne by those who benefit the
most by its disposal. Additionally, these decisions have placed the
corporate community on notice that the courts will expand tradi-
tional doctrines of common law to replenish the Superfund coffers
which perpetuate the cleanup of abandoned and inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites.
4. Lessors and Lessees
Lessors and lessees of real estate face unexpected liabilities if
sources of contamination are found on the leased property. In United
States v. Monsanto Co., °10 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit imposed joint and several liability for CERCLA response
costs on an absentee landowner who leased warehouse space to a
corporation that was deemed responsible for depositing hazardous
wastes on the leased property. 0 2 The court held that even though
the lessors were completely unaware of the disposal activities un-
dertaken by the lessees, the imposition of liability was proper be-
cause CERCLA "does not sanction such willful or negligent blindness
101. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
102. Id. at 171-73.
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on the part of absent landowners." 103 In addition, the courts have
imposed liability for the response costs necessary to cleanup a con-
taminated site upon a lessee who caused the contamination. 1°4 Also,
a current lessee is subject to liability for the contamination caused
by a sublessee. 105
5. Trustees
In conjunction with the increase in CERCLA litigation, the courts
have continued to expand the sphere of CERCLA liability to impose
financial responsibility on parties having even the most remote in-
terest in contaminated property. For example in an isolated decision,
a court imposed liability on a trustee under the CERCLA "owner"
standards because the responsibilities granted to the trustee justified
ownership status.6 In United States v. Burns,0 7 a trust held title
to property that was previously contaminated by the release of haz-
ardous wastes. The court utilized an expansive interpretation of
"owner," as suggested by CERCLA's legislative history, 08 to impose
personal liability for response costs on the trustee and sole bene-
ficiary of the trust. 10 9
IV. PROCEDURES TO LMT ENvIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
A. Statutory Defenses
Even though the courts generally apply the CERCLA liability
standard without regard to fault, the Act expressly provides three
103. Id. at 169. See also, United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748
(W.D. Mich. 1982) (holding a landowner/lessor liable for response costs even though the lessee was
solely responsible for the disposal of contaminated wastes at the leased site); United States v. Argent
Corp., 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1984) (holding that a landowner/lessor is an
"owner" susceptible to liability under CERCLA).
104. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645, 651-52 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984).
105. E.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1577 1581 (D.S.C. 1984).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, No. C-88-94-L (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 1988).
107. Id.
108. The legislative history states that "owner" was intended to "include not only those persons
who hold title ... but those in the absences of holding a title, possess some equivalent evidence of
ownership." See H. R. RaP. No. 172, supra note 79, at 36.
109. The court also stated that "Congress did not intend for a responsible party to be able to
avoid liability through the use of a trust or other forms of ownership." Burns, No. C-88-94-L, citing
Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044-45). See also, III SCOTT ON TRusTs §§ 265, 265.1, slip op. at 4 (a
trustee is subject to personal liability for trust property by mere virtue of ownership of the property).
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defenses against liability. The statute provides protection against
liability for response costs incurred as a result of contamination
released solely by an act of God, 110 act of war,"' or an act or omis-
sion of a third party with whom the property owner had no con-
tractual relationship.1 While the courts recognize only these defenses
as effectively limiting liability, these statutory defenses have met
considerable resistance with limited success."' These defenses have
proven unsuccessful as a result of the court's narrow interpretation
of the statutory language.1 4 Additionally, the court's broad inter-
pretation of the general CERCLA liability provisions serves to fur-
ther limit the application of these defenses.? 5
Real estate practitioners are well aware of the inability to control
the acts of God or the acts of war. As a result, most documents
that transfer an interest in real estate are replete with boilerplate
provisions that allocate rights and remedies should an uncontrollable
act of God or an act of war occur. However, problems arising from
the acts of unrelated third parties are more difficult to solve.
In response to the liability problems surrounding unrelated third
parties, CERCLA provides a relatively convoluted defense provision
to protect landowners from the financial consequences associated
with contamination created by third parties." 6 Even though some-
what confusing, this "third party" or "innocent purchase" defense
is perhaps the most plausible and therefore the most useful statutory
defense available to property owners. This defense is available to
owners or operators of a facility that has been contaminated solely
by the acts or omissions of "unrelated" third parties. A third party
is "unrelated" to a property owner in the absence of a contractual
relationship between the parties." 7 The 1986 Superfund Amendments
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (1982).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2) (1982).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
113. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 286 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (describing the scope of liability as "extremely broad" and the available defenses as "ex-
tremely limited").
114. See Glass, supra note 22, at 395.
115. Id.
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defined the term "contractual relationship" to include land con-
tracts, deeds, and other instruments necessary for the transfer of
title to or possession of real property."8 Due to the broad definition
of "contractual relationship," a landowner is liable for contami-
nation caused by a seller, a predecessor in the chain of title, or a
third party linked to the land by a lease, contract or other legal
mechanism.
To obtain the full benefit of the "third party" defense, the land
owner is held to a higher standard than merely proving that an
unrelated third party was the sole cause of the hazardous release.
The landowner must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that "due care" was exercised in light of all relevant facts and cir-
cumstances and that all precautions were taken against foreseeable
acts or omissions of the third party." 9 The shear breadth of the
requirements necessary to qualify for the "third party" defense cre-
ates, at best, a narrow measure of relief for the property owner or
operator.120
118. For the purpose of CERCLA:
The term 'contractual relationship', .. includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deed,
or other instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the
facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement
of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances
described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance
of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no
reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened
release was disposed of on, in or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, or through
any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain
authority by purchase of condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has satisfied
the requirement of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Section 9607 (b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title provide that the defendant must establish "by a
preponderance of the evidence that ... he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and . . . he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions
of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions
." 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(3)(a), (b).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
120. See, e.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1032 (Real estate developer acquired land for devel-
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As a result of the nature of these qualifications, the 1986 Su-
perfund Amendments established the "innocent landowner/pur-
chaser" provisions, which operated to expand the "third party"
defense and provide additional comfort to owners and operators.
Under this provision, despite the existence of a contractual nexus
between the landowner and the polluter, the landowner is not liable
for the acts of the third party if he can prove that at the time of
acquiring title or taking possession he undertook a reasonable in-
vestigation and had no reason to believe that the property was con-
taminated. The "innocent landowner" provision appears to expand
the availability of the third party defense by protecting the innocent
purchaser from unknowingly acquiring liability that was not bar-
gained for in the property transaction. However, in order to benefit
from this defense, a party must make all appropriate inquiries into
the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice. 12 1 Due to these stringent quali-
fications it is difficult to establish a position as an innocent property
owner or operator. To the extent that innocent landowner status is
established, the third party statutory defense provisions are avail-
able. However, given the due diligence standard required for in-
nocent status, this defense is likely to succeed in only the most narrow
circumstances.
opment. At the time of acquisition, developer/purchaser was aware that hazardous waste was stored
at the site. The court denied "third-party" defense claim because defendant did not take the requisite
precautions against these foreseeable acts or omissions.); United States v. South Carolina Recycling
& Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D.S.C. 1984) (denying "third-party" defense to a landowner
due to a lease agreement with responsible party); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20616 (D.N.M. 1984) (affirmative "third-party" defense based on complete absence
of causation was not available to landowners who entered into lease with company which stored
hazardous wastes on property). Cf. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20992, 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (A bank that had financed the waste disposal company foreclosed on
property and then made the high bid itself at the sheriff's sale. It then assigned the bid to the
defendants. The bank's role in the transfer of ownership from the waste generator to the defendants
arguably created an indirect connection, but the court ruled there was no contractual relationship
between the two. Accordingly, the court refused to grant summary judgment on liability against the
current owners due to the lack of the necessary contractual relationship.).
121. 'Good commercial or customary practice' means that a "reasonable inquiry must have been
made in all circumstances, in light of the best business and land transfer principles. Those engaged
in commercial transactions should ... be held to a higher standard than those who are not engaged
in private residential transactions." H. R. RP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 187 (1986).
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The courts have not been called on to interpret the CERCLA
defense provisions to a great extent. However, the courts that have
addressed this issue have indicated that the "due diligence" and
"appropriate inquiry" provisions are purely factual standards that
are scrutinized on a case-by-case basis. Due to the limited judicial
interpretation of the statutory defense provisions, a well-defined body
of law has not developed. Therefore, the real estate practitioner will
find difficulty in developing an adequate method of transferring real
property interests that enables an innocent purchaser to take ad-
vantage of the full benefits of the third party defense.
B. Environmental Investigation
The real estate industry has had limited experience with proce-
dures to reduce environmental liability other than the statutory de-
fenses promulgated in CERCLA § 107(b). Possible procedures that
may limit the financial exposure of an owner or operator include
procurement of insurance coverage, inclusion of contractual pro-
visions to allocate liability, and perhaps the most important, per-
formance of an environmental survey of the site to determine the
presence or absence of environmental wastes. A complete environ-
mental audit is vitally important in reducing uncertainties regarding
environmental liabilities. Additionally, the audit will provide con-
siderable weight in fulfilling the "due diligence" and "appropriate
inquiry" requirements of the third party defense provision. Also, a
thorough environmental audit will provide information on a facil-
ity's compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations
as well as a foundation to estimate the potential range of liability
associated with any given site.
There are no uniform standards available that regulate the per-
formance of an environmental audit. However, the assessment should
begin with a visual inspection of the site. The initial inspection of
a site should identify both the type of business conducted as well
as any potential sources of contamination. A preliminary investi-
gation is necessary to determine the need for a more expensive and
comprehensive assessment.
In the event a full scale environmental audit is required, a pro-
spective owner or operator should review the history of the site for
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any industrial activity, including any manufacturing processes util-
ized; any on-site or off-site waste disposal operations; and any on-
site storage facilities such as above-ground and underground tanks,
drum storage areas, surface impoundments, and storm water runoff
areas. This information can be compiled through a review of the
publicly filed land records and environmental reports and through
discussions with the current owners and operators of the site. Further
indications of contamination may be confirmed by chemical analysis,
including soil sampling and groundwater testing.
A properly performed audit will determine the extent and severity
of actual or threatened environmental hazards. Additionally, the au-
dit will provide counsel with a foundation to prepare an opinion
letter as to the potential exposure to environmental liability. There-
fore, even though a complete environmental audit is a very expensive
and time consuming undertaking, the overriding financial risks aris-
ing out of possible CERCLA litigation makes a thorough investi-
gation mandatory.
C. Contractual Provisions
A complete environmental audit provides essential information
to assist the real estate practitioner in the evaluation of potential
exposure to CERCLA liability. The practitioner will find this in-
formation useful to effectively allocate liability for both known and
unexpected hazardous material problems when drafting purchase or
lease agreements and other contractual arrangements that facilitate
the transfer of interests in real estate. Generally, liability allocation
provisions take the form of warranties, indemnifications, certifi-
cations, disclaimers, and representations. These provisions should
be drafted to meet the specific needs of the concerned owner or
operator. For example, a purchase or lease agreement may include
a provision to allocate financial responsibility for the cleanup of
known hazardous wastes; a provision that requires a seller to certify
compliance with pertinent hazardous waste legislation; an indem-
nification provision to protect the buyer against any unforeseen en-
vironmental liabilities; a seller representation that the property has
never been subject to the release of hazardous wastes; or a repre-
sentation made by the purchaser that a diligent investigation was
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conducted and no hazardous wastes were found. These contractual
provisions are useful to remove uncertainties associated with po-
tential financial exposure to hazardous waste liabilities. However,
while a warranty or indemnification provision may provide a seller
with a cause of action against a third party polluter under a contract
theory, these provisions do not provide a defense to an action brought
against an owner or operator under the strict liability provisions of
CERCLA.'22
D. Insurance
Comprehensive general liability insurance policies provide cov-
erage for bodily injury and property damage that result from sudden
and accidental incidents which occur during the policy period. 12 These
traditional policies may not cover the non-accidental, gradual dis-
charge and release of environmental wastes.'2 The insurance in-
dustry has recently developed environmental impairment liability
policies to cover the nonsudden discharge of environmental wastes. 25
The appropriate scope of coverage for a company will depend on
the nature of the risks present at a specific site and the needs of
the insured. 126 Therefore, property owners and operators should re-
view their current insurance coverage to determine the extent of their
non-insured financial exposure to environmental liability.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the dichotomy that has emerged as a
result of the interaction between the practice of traditional property
law and the recent concern over the protection of the environ-
ment. On one hand Congress has addressed the concern surround-
122. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804
F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
123. See Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 45, at 114.
124. When a company has discharged pollutants over a lengthy period of time many courts have
held that the release is not "sudden and accidental." New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp.
99, 109-110 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571,
1573 (S.D. Ga. 1987). Cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F.
Supp. 1139, 1154-55 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
125. See Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 45, at 115.
126. See id. at 116.
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ing the cleanup of previously abandoned and inactive waste disposal
sites through the passage of the comprehensive CERCLA legislation.
However, on the other hand CERCLA has proven to be a hastily
conceived and convoluted body of law that provides the courts with
very little guidance as to its intended scope of liability. As a result,
this legislation has introduced an unconventional environmental li-
ability scheme into the sphere of real property law and has created
exposure to considerable financial risks that were not previously con-
sidered by those in the real estate industry.
Due to the lack of guidance provided by CERCLA, the decided
trend of the courts has been toward expanding responsibility through
the development of standards of strict and joint and several liability.
Under this newly created standard of liability, the courts may impose
a disproportionate financial burden on property owners or operators
that may have had little or nothing to do with the actual disposal
or release of toxic wastes at a site. Additionally, some parties may
escape their relative portion of financial responsibility unless a con-
tribution action is established through further litigation.
In view of the liabilities imposed by CERCLA and the heavy
costs associated with any cleanup of hazardous wastes, property
owners, operators, sellers, purchasers and others with an interest in
real estate should begin to take measures to limit their exposure to
environmental liabilities. The process of minimizing exposure to en-
vironmental liability rests on the identification and allocation of all
known risks. The first step in reducing the risks associated with the
transfer of interests in real property begins with a preliminary en-
vironmental survey to determine whether any hazardous substances
are present on the site. The range of potential liability is vast and
in some circumstances may be estimated only after detailed review
of a site. A properly performed environmental audit will assist a
potential purchaser in the determination of seller's degree of com-
pliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations. Addi-
tionally, the environmental audit will provide counsel with a basis
to prepare an opinion letter as to the potential exposure to envi-
ronmental liability. Subsequent to an environmental audit, an agree-
ment to transfer an interest in real property can be drafted and
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The inherent risks now associated with real estate transactions
can never be entirely avoided. However, advice on ways to minimize
those risks can be offered. The process of assessing the environ-
mental risks associated with the transfer of a parcel of property will
be expensive and time consuming. However, given the current stat-
utory interpretations, the failure to identify the extent and severity
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